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A PUF-Based and Cloud-Assisted Lightweight Authentication for
Multi-Hop Body Area Network
Xiao Tan, Jiliang Zhang , Yuanjing Zhang, Zheng Qin, Yong Ding, and Xingwei Wang
Abstract: Wireless sensor technology plays an important role in the military, medical, and commercial ﬁelds
nowadays. Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN) is a special application of the wireless sensor network in human
health monitoring, through which patients can know their physical condition in real time and respond to emergencies
on time. Data reliability, guaranteed by the trust of nodes in WBAN, is a prerequisite for the effective treatment of
patients. Therefore, authenticating the sensor nodes and the sink nodes in WBAN is necessary. This paper proposes
a lightweight Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)-based and cloud-assisted authentication mechanism for multi-hop
body area networks, which compared with the star single-hop network, can enhance the adaptability to human
motion and the integrity of data transmission. Such authentication mechanism can signiﬁcantly reduce the storage
overhead and resource loss in the data transmission process.
Key words: Physical Unclonable Function (PUF); hardware security; Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN)
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Introduction

With the rapid development of networks, wireless
communication,
and
sensor
manufacturing
[1–4]
technology
, a large number of portable wireless
devices have emerged and the body-centric Wireless
Body Area Network (WBAN) has attracted much
attention. Telemedicine monitoring is a typical
application of WBAN in the medical ﬁeld. Physiological
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data are collected by arranging wireless sensors and
implantable equipment on the patient’s body, and then
are sent to the Internet via sink nodes. A physician
in a remote area can analyze the data and provide a
treatment plan on time. Telemedicine monitoring avoids
the inconvenience that traditional patients and doctors
must meet face to face for treatment and can expand
the patient’s activity space. For healthy groups, WBAN
can provide health monitoring. For example, during an
athlete’s exercise, the training rhythm and training plan
can be effectively adjusted by monitoring the athlete’s
heartbeat, body temperature, and other physiological
parameters in real time. Therefore, WBAN plays a
signiﬁcant part in our daily life, medical treatment,
entertainment, and the military.
WBAN brings great convenience to people, while its
open features also bring serious security risks. Sensors
collect physiological data that are closely related to
the human body. Any case of data leakage will
result in many problems, including the following: (1)
The disclosure of patient’s privacy: Patients do not
want others to know their illnesses; moreover, after
adversaries intercept the data, they are likely to sell the
illness information to some private medical institutions
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or insurance companies, which violates patients’ privacy.
(2) Security risks: Adversaries may sneak into the
network by forging the identity of a node by node attacks
or physical cloning attacks and send the fake data to the
sink node; this would seriously affect the physician’s
diagnosis and the formulation of the corresponding
treatment plan, and is even life-threatening. For example,
by attacking the cardiac pacemaker on a wireless virtual
patient, the heart rate can be increased or reduced. If
the device contains a deﬁbrillator, the attacker can make
the deﬁbrillator repeatedly vibrate, which endangers the
lives of patients.
In recent years, several approaches have been
proposed to address the privacy and security issues
caused by the open features of WBAN[5] . However,
most of the methods are oriented to data transmission
process. It is necessary to establish a secure topology
before data transmission. The authentication of sensor
nodes and sink nodes in WBAN is the prerequisite
for establishing security topology and guaranteeing
secure data transmission. Therefore, it requires that the
circulating data come from legitimate nodes. However,
most of the current authentication schemes[6] are
based on star single-hop networks, which have several
disadvantages, including the following: (1) The data
transmission between sensor nodes and sink nodes
consumes a large amount of power and resources for
authentication; (2) A compromised sensor node will have
a signiﬁcant impact on the data collection of WBAN;
(3) Human motion affects the data transmission. Star
single-hop networks are not suitable for WBAN because
of the effect of human motion, whereas the tree multihop network can reduce the inﬂuence of human motion
and support dynamic reconstruction.
This paper proposes a lightweight authentication
mechanism for multi-hop WBAN based on crossover
Ring Oscillator (RO) Physical Unclonable Functions
(PUFs)[7] , which can implement the hierarchical
authentication on the body-centric WBAN. The cloudassisted method is deployed between the sink nodes, and
the adjacent sensor nodes can largely reduce the storage
overhead of the WBAN. Sensor nodes and inlayer nodes
that are far from the sink nodes are authenticated through
a shared-key generated by the crossover RO PUF[8] .
All sensor nodes are authenticated by the sink node
via trusted transmission. In the authentication process,
the outer node does not need to directly transmit the
information required for authentication, and this largely
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reduces the resource overhead.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Related work is elaborated in Section 2. The proposed
lightweight authentication mechanism for WBAN is
elaborated in Section 3. Potential security threats
and countermeasures are analyzed in Section 4. The
detailed experimental results and analyses are reported
in Section 5. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.

2
2.1

Related Work
Node authentication of WBAN

Along with the widespread usage of WBAN, its security
issues have attracted much attention in the industry and
academia. The important issues related to the security
of WBAN were summarized in Refs. [5, 6, 9]: data
reliability, data security, data freshness, scalability, and
privacy protection. Among these problems, it is crucial
to ensure data reliability, which is an important basis
for the implementation of other security measures. In
addition, it is necessary to consider the characteristics of
severely limited resources for WBAN.
Data reliability is guaranteed mainly through
node authentication in WBAN. In general, the
node authentication is implemented by traditional
symmetric encryption algorithms, such as the
TinySec[10] , Timed-Efﬁcient Stream Loss-tolerant
Authentication (TESLA)[11] , and MiniSec[12] . The
encryption algorithms involved in these schemes include
data encryption standard, Triple Data Encryption
Standard (Triple DES), XOR, or other low-cost modes.
TinySec provides authentication, data integrity, and data
conﬁdentiality protection with lower computational and
storage overheads. However, Almheiri and Alqamzi[13]
found that for a key distribution mechanism, once a
single node is compromised, the entire network will
become insecure. Chuchaisri and Newman[14] proposed
that TESLA provides origin authentication and message
integrity protection by using a one-way hash chain and
delayed key disclosure techniques. However, it requires
time synchronization between all nodes in the network,
which may cause a long delay in authentication. The
MiniSec solution is publicly available and has a high
level of security. However, high computational overhead
is incurred when large packets are transmitted over the
radio.
Zhao et al.[15] pointed out that the traditional
authentication method implemented in the upper layer
of the Open System Interconnection (OSI) reference
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model usually consumes a lot of energy, and requires
massive changes at the hardware or software level.
Ma et al.[16] proposed TinyZKP, which is a WBAN
authentication scheme based on zero-knowledge proof.
Their experiments showed that it can defend against
replay attacks and guessing attacks. Liu et al.[17]
proposed the BGMM model, which is specially oriented
to WBAN and enables it to better adapt to human
movement. Salam et al.[18] proposed PMAS for twoway authentication between the sink node and the sensor
node, and implemented key sharing by improving the
Difﬁe-Hellman key exchange scheme. Yuan et al.[19]
proposed ASK-BAN for fast authentication and key
extraction in WBAN; the model can simultaneously
perform authentication and key extraction without
additional hardware to obtain physical layer features.
Nevertheless, such authentication lacks stability.
2.2

PUF

PUF is a novel hardware security primitive for key
generation and device authentication[20] . Most PUFs
provide a unique device-dependent mapping from a set
of challenges to a set of responses (Challenge Response
Pairs, or CRPs) based on the unclonable properties of
the underlying physical device[21, 22] . Even with the
same design, different manufactured PUFs have different
CRPs[23] . It is suitable for various security-related
applications, such as two-factor authentication[24] , antioverbuilding[25] , IP protection[23, 26] , and resisting of
FPGA replay attacks[27] and code-reuse attacks[28] .
Moreover, they can be classiﬁed into strong PUFs
and weak PUFs. Strong PUFs provide a huge number
of unique CRPs for authentication protocols[21] . A
typical PUF-based authentication includes two stages,
registration and authentication[29] . In the registration
stage, the PUF CRPs are collected from the devices
and stored in the server. In the authentication stage,
the challenge is sent to the device terminal, and then
the terminal device sends the corresponding response
to the server. Finally, the response is compared with
the previous stored response. If the two responses are
the same or within an acceptable error threshold, the
authentication passes, otherwise, the authentication fails.
Compared with the star single-hop network, the tree
multi-hop network is more adaptable to human motion
and can enhance the data integrity of data transmission.
This paper proposes a PUF-based and cloud-assisted
lightweight authentication mechanism for multi-hop
WBAN. The cloud-assisted authentication can reduce

the WBAN storage overhead. The deployed CRO PUF[7]
in the authentication mechanism has high reliability
and ﬂexibility. Especially, it is well-known that how
to distribute keys securely and effectively is the most
difﬁcult problem in the key management, while the PUFbased shared-key generation method[8] provides a new
solution to address the issue.

3

Proposed Lightweight Authentication for
WBANs

The framework of the proposed hierarchical
authentication is illustrated in Fig. 1.
In the proposed authentication scheme, the cloud acts
as a Trusted Third Party (TTP) to store the CRPs of
the PUF. The authentication between the inlayer node
and the sink node aims to compare the PUF response of
the sensor node with the stored response in the cloud.
In addition, the authentication between the outer sensor
nodes is primarily achieved by comparing the shared-key
generated by the crossover RO PUF.
The traditional authentication protocols based on star
single-hop network perform the authentication between
sensor nodes and sink nodes, since the sensor nodes
in this network topology communicate directly with the
sink nodes. However, the nodes far away from sink nodes
communicate with the sensor nodes closer to them rather
than the sink nodes. If they are directly authenticated
with sink nodes, communication will require large power
consumption. Therefore, the hierarchical authentication
is proposed to authenticate the sink nodes and sensor
nodes in the body area network.
Trusted third party

Cloud

Sink node

Authentication
between sensor nodes
and the sink node
Key-sharing
protocol based
on Frossover
RO PUF

Fig. 1
Framework
authentication.

Authentication
between sensor nodes

of

the

proposed

hierarchical
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Hierarchical authentication means that all sensor
nodes are split into two parts according to the distance
from the sink nodes. Nodes closer to the sink nodes are
called inlayer nodes, and others are collectively termed
as outer nodes. As shown in Fig. 1, the green nodes are
considered as inlayer nodes and the rest nodes are outer
nodes. Different methods are adopted to authenticate
these two types of nodes. According to the transitivity
of trust, the inlayer node passing the authentication of
the sink node demonstrates that the sink node trusts the
inlayer sensor node. In this case, if the inlayer node can
be trusted by the outer node, the sink node will be also
considered to trust the outer node, and the nodes in the
entire network topology will trust each other.
3.1

Authentication between the inlayer node and
sink node

In a tree multi-hop network, the inlayer node and the sink
node are very close. Thus, the inlayer nodes centered on
the sink nodes remain unchanged during human motion.
Several CRPs are generated based on a PUF. These
responses are stable, unique, and unpredictable. The PUF
can be embedded as a logical unit in the sensor node, and
the set of PUF CRPs embedded in each sensor node can
be stored in the cloud. The cloud separates the storage
units based on different sink nodes, and the internals
of each storage unit separately store the information
corresponding to each sensor node.
Before the storage, each sensor node submits the
features of the embedded crossover RO PUF to the
cloud. Moreover, the cloud can derive the conﬁguration
information of the shared key between these sensor
nodes.
When the sink node authenticates the sensor node, the
sensor node serves as the initiator, and the sink node
acts as the authenticator. Before authentication, the sink
node broadcasts its own ID, and then the sensor node
can obtain the ID and raise an authentication request to
the sink node. During the authentication, the cloud is
considered as a TTP, reducing the storage overhead in
resource-constrained environments. Furthermore, when
the sink node requests to access the CRPs of the PUF,
the request can be veriﬁed according to the sink node ID.
Thus, only the legitimate sink node can access the CRPs
and the conﬁguration information.
Figure 2 shows the authentication process between
the sensor node and the sink node. Before sending data,
Sensor A submits its ID (IDA / to the sink node. After

,'
&KDOOHQJH

Sensor A

,'
S+CA+
5HVSRQVH
+Trust=1

5HVXOW
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Cloud TTP

Sink Qode

Fig. 2
node.

Authentication between the inlayer node and sink

receiving IDA , the sink node will send IDA to the cloud
along with its own ID (SinkID). If SinkID can be veriﬁed
by the cloud, the cloud randomly selects the selection
signal (S) and the challenge signal (Challenge) and
acquires the corresponding response signal (Response)
according to IDA and SinkID. Challenge and Response
are XORed to generate CA . Subsequently, the cloud
sends S , CA , and Response to the sink node to ensure
that the attacker cannot directly obtain the challenge
response information. The CRPs are then removed
from the database, and the Trust ﬁeld value is set
to 1. TrustD 1 represents the cloud trusting the sink
node. After receiving Trust, the sink node saves it and
XORs the received CA and Response to acquire the real
challenge. The sink node sends Challenge and S, as
well as the Trust ﬁeld to the authentication requestor,
Sensor A. On receiving this message, Sensor A extracts
S and then inputs it to the PUF to acquire the response
signal. In the meantime, Sensor A checks the value of
the Trust ﬁeld. In the case of Trust D 1, the Response
and the received Challenge are XORed to generate
Result. Sensor A compares the Result with the received
Response information. If both are consistent or do not
reach the threshold, Result is submitted to the sink
node. Next, the sink node compares the received Result
with the previously received Response from the cloud,
thereby achieving the authentication of the sensor node
by the sink node.
In brief, the authentication process of the inlayer node
is as follows. Sensor A ﬁrst veriﬁes the received Trust
ﬁeld, and then compares the response signal generated
by itself with the response signal from the sink node.
The speciﬁc process is illustrated in Fig. 3.
Sensor A

Sink Qode

Cloud

Sensor ID

Enter the challenge
into the embedded
PUF to get
the response

Verify the Trust field

Fig. 3

S & &KDOOHQJH &
Trust & 5HVSRQVH
Real excitation
signal

Generated 5HVSRQVH
Ͱ &KDOOHQJH

Sensor ID & SinkID
S & &KDOOHQJH &
5HVSRQVH & Trust=1
Qot a true excitation
response signal

Verify that the SinkID
exists and extract
the stimulus response
information
corresponding to the
Sensor ID
Set the Trust field to 1

Complete the authentication
by receiving the message from
the sensor and the challenge
information from the cloud.

Authentication process of inlayer node.
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As shown in Fig. 3, although the cloud can ensure
that the sink node is trusted by verifying the CRPs, this
information may be maliciously tampered or hijacked
when the challenge-response information is sent to the
sink node. We assume that a malicious attacker cannot
forge the ID of a sink node; if the attacker has such
ability, the security of the remote end cannot be ensured.
Under this assumption, in receiving the message from the
sink node, the sensor node will compare the sink node
ID with the previous ID, which is saved in the broadcast
phase of the sink node. If the two IDs are consistent
and the Trust ﬁeld is displayed to be trusted, the sensor
node will consider that the sink node is trusted, thereby
authenticating the sink node. The sensor node gives the
response to the sink node. After comparing the response
at the sink node, the mutual authentication between the
sink node and the inlayer sensor node is achieved.
3.2

Authentication between sensor nodes

The authentication between the outer sensor node and
the inlayer sensor node is performed by a sharedkey between the nodes, which is a one-to-many
authentication process. The success of the shared-key
comparison marks the passing of authentication.
The shared-key can be distributed through key preallocation. However, as described in the previous section,
this will lead to additional overhead. Furthermore, once
the key pool that lacks the dynamic update process
is built, attackers can easily acquire all the keys by
modeling attacks. After all the keys are obtained, the
authentication link of the node is ineffective.
Thus, the authentication between the sensor nodes is
implemented by the crossover RO PUF. By embedding
the crossover RO PUF at different sensor nodes and
conﬁguring the selection of the challenge, a shared-key
between the sensor nodes can be yielded. To be speciﬁc,
ﬁrst, the feature of the crossover RO PUF is sent to the
TTP. Subsequently, the mapping between the challenges
is completed under the same selection signal to gain
the same response signal which serves as a shared-key
between the nodes. The storage form of the conﬁguration
information in the TTP is shown in Fig. 4. What is stored
in the TTP is the inverter delay information in each
layer RO link in the crossover RO PUF. Accordingly, the
output of the speciﬁc response can be derived by setting
the selection signal and the challenge.
The outer sensor node will transmit its own ID when
requesting authentication. The node that has achieved
the authentication transmits the ID of the sensor node

Fig. 4

Generation of shared key conﬁguration information.

to the sink node, and the sink node takes the node with
the highest trust as the authenticator to respond to the
authentication request of the sensor node.
Sensor A serves as the initiator of the authentication
request, and Sensor B completes the authentication,
which is considered as a trusted node. The speciﬁc
authentication process is presented as follows.
(1) Sensor A generates a random number RandA and
then submits RandA and IDA (Sensor A’s ID) to the
authenticator, Sensor B.
(2) After receiving the message from Sensor A, Sensor
B generates a random number RandB and sends fRandA ,
IDA , RandB , IDB g to the sink.
(3) Subsequently, the sink applies to the TTP for the
previously stored selection signal S and challenge CA
and CB .
(4) The sink node encrypts fS , RandA , IDB , CA g using
KAS , which is the shared-key of Sensor A and the sink
node, to yield fS , RandA , IDB , CA gKAS . Next, ffS ,
RandA , IDB , CA g KAS , IDA , RandB , CB , S g KBS is
generated using KBS , which is the shared-key between
the sink node and Sensor B. Then, the message is
returned to Sensor B.
(5) Sensor B decrypts the message with KBS and then
veriﬁes whether RandB is consistent with the previous
one. If not, the authentication process will be terminated.
Otherwise, Sensor B will send fS , RandA , IDB , CA gKAS
and the selected intermediate value MidNum to Sensor
A according to IDA . Moreover, S and CB generate a
response by the crossover RO PUF.
(6) After receiving fS, RandA , IDB , CA gKAS and
MidNum, Sensor A decrypts the message with KAS to
yield S, RandA , and CA . Afterward, it judges whether
Sensor B is trusted by comparing RandA . If RandA is
consistent with the previous one, S and CA are used
for the crossover RO PUF to obtain a response. The
response and the received MidNum are XORed to derive
MidNum1, and then Sensor A sends MidNum1 to Sensor
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B according to IDB .
(7) After receiving the MidNum1, Sensor B performs
an XOR operation with the response generated by the
previous Sensor B. If the result is consistent with
MidNum, Sensor A is considered to be trusted. Sensor
B will return the authentication result to the sink node
and send an ACK/Reject message to Sensor A.
The entire authentication process is illustrated in
Fig. 5.

4

Security Analysis

4.1

Security analysis of CRO PUF

In recent years, the unpredictable, unclonable, and
tamper-proof features of PUF have been questioned.
As a result, the security of PUF has also aroused huge
attention. Some attacks against PUF have been proposed,
e.g., model attacks and physically clonable attacks. The
defense methods of the crossover RO PUF against these
two common attacks are discussed below.
4.1.1

Modeling attacks

Machine learning is the most well-known attack on
strong PUFs which have a public access interface for
CRPs. Therefore, attackers are easy to collect sufﬁcient
CRPs for modeling. Machine learning can model strong
PUFs with high prediction accuracies. However, the
modeling attack requires considerable CRPs and hence
is not applicable to weak PUFs.
4.1.2

Physically clonable attacks

Merli et al.[30] successfully implemented a physically
clonable attack on SRAM PUF for the ﬁrst time. The
major reason is that the SRAM will emit near-infrared
light when it is read, and the power value of the unit
can be obtained by the emitted light. Since the interstage crossovers and the inverters in the crossover RO
PUF are independent of each other, malicious attackers
6HQVRU$
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,'% 5DQG%

6LQNQRGH
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cannot derive any delay information of the inverter by
acquiring the conﬁguration information. In addition,
the CRO PUF can dynamically change the number of
inverters in the RO, which can be implemented using
different conﬁguration data to generate an unclonable
bits string. In this case, the physical location of each
RO is not ﬁxed, and it is also a novel method to resist
side-channel attacks. In addition, the security level of the
crossover RO PUF can be improved by increasing the
number of ROs and inverters in each RO. Furthermore,
the generated response can be XORed with the challenge
and the result is used as the conﬁguration of the next
challenge.
4.2

Security analysis of the inlayer authentication

In the inlayer authentication scheme, after the sensor
node initiates an authentication request, the sink node
should request the selection and challenge signals that
are used for authentication and the response signal
for comparison to the cloud. The cloud is considered
as a TTP throughout the authentication process. It
stores the selection signal of the sensor node and the
mapping relationship of challenges and responses. For
each sink node, only the selection, the challenge, and
the corresponding response output are required, and the
mapping relation with other nodes should not be stored.
However, to unify the storage forms, the cloud still stores
the mapping relations. The responses generated by these
additional mappings can be used for intermediate values
between the sensor nodes to verify the shared-key.
When accessing data from the cloud, the sink node
should provide its own ID and sensor ID. We assume
that the process of requesting access to data is secure
and an attacker has the following capabilities.
(1) The attacker is capable of intercepting the
information during the communication between the
nodes; examples of such information include the data
returned by the cloud to the sink node, and the data
exchanged between the sink node and the sensor node.
(2) The attacker model is based on the intercepted
information. For instance, it can build a corresponding
mapping model based on the challenge-response
information.
(3) An attacker can imitate the ID of a sink node or
sensor node, and launch common attacks, such as denial
of service attack and middleman attack.
In the inlayer scheme, there are two main information
interactions. The ﬁrst one is between the cloud and the
sink node, whereby the cloud returns the challenge-
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response information to the sink node. The second
one is the information interaction process between the
sink node and the sensor node. According to the above
assumption, data in the two information interactions are
likely to be intercepted.
The proposed authentication scheme is capable of
preventing the above attacks effectively. The main
reasons are as follows.
(1) In the above attack scenario, the challenge
intercepted by the malicious attacker is the signal that has
been generated by the true value and the response signal
being XORed, instead of the true challenge information
that can directly act on the RO PUF in the sensor node.
After the sensor node initiates the request, the trusted
sink node still has no response, because the sink node
does not get the challenge-response signal from the cloud
on time, and it is yet in a waiting state. Then, if the
attacker directly sends the obtained challenge-response
signal and the Trust to the crossover RO PUF, which is
embedded in sensor nodes, the obtained output response
would be found to be inconsistent with the received
response signal. The sensor node believes that the sink
node is not trusted and will voluntarily give up this
authentication. Thus, it is infeasible for an attacker to
defraud the trust of the sensor node by simply obtaining
cloud data.
(2) If a malicious attacker compromises the sensor
node by consuming its resources and introduces
unfriendly sensor nodes to the network after exhausting
the resources, the attacker can employ these sensor
nodes to deliver malicious parameters or provide
wrong treatment to patients, thereby leading to serious
consequences. Accordingly, in the scheme design, when
the sensor node does not receive the response of the
sink node for three consecutive authentication requests,
the sensor node will send an ATKD 1 ﬁeld to the sink
node. This ﬁeld indicates the network is abnormal or
has been maliciously attacked. The sink node will check
the network status. If the network status is abnormal,
ACKD 1 is sent to the sensor node, indicating that a
malicious attack occurs. Subsequently, the sensor node
will no longer initiate an authentication request, and
the data collection will be suspended. When the sink
node sends a signal to the outer layer server via the
network, the data collected by the node is revealed to
be temporarily not trusted. Thus, it is unpractical for an
attacker to compromise the sensor node by exhausting
the sensor node resources.
The above discussion illustrates that the proposed
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inlayer authentication scheme can implement mutual
authentication between the sink node and the sensor
node. Even if an attacker intercepts crucial authentication
information, the scheme can ensure that the sensor
node is not compromised. The data required in the
authentication process are not directly transmitted in
the form of plain text. Even if the attacker acquires the
information, acquiring the corresponding plain text takes
a long time. The ﬂexibility of the crossover RO PUF
conﬁguration makes the modeling attack for the PUF
more difﬁcult and ensures the security of the inlayer
authentication.
4.3

Security analysis of authentication between
sensor nodes

The outer sensor node selects the similar node close
to itself to transmit the data. The multi-hop makes it
possible that the next hop node is not the inlayer node.
Besides, it possibly remains an outer node. In the case of
only two hops, if the inlayer node is deemed trustworthy
by the sink node, it is necessary for outer sensor node to
be authenticated by the inlayer node.
The mapping relation among the challenges of the
adjacent nodes is not stored inside the sensor node.
Accordingly, the attacker cannot directly obtain the
challenge-response signal from the sensor node. In our
authentication scheme, the selection signal S and the
challenge C of the node that initiated the authentication
are encrypted by the shared-key between the node that
initiated the authentication and the sink node. Although
the attacker has derived the message, the attacker cannot
extract the selection signal and the challenge from the
message without KAS . Moreover, KAS can be encrypted
by the bijective function during the transmission process.
It is virtually unlikely for attackers to derive it. Thus, the
attacker cannot obtain the challenge and the selection
signal by intercepting the transmitted data.
In the proposed authentication scheme, the
authenticator derives the required data by decrypting,
and then sends the rest of the data to the initiator, and
selects a value of MidNum. Afterward, the MidNum is
transmitted to the initiator through the bijective function
encryption. After the initiator decrypts, this value will
be XORed with the response generated by itself to
get the Result. The Result should also be encrypted
by the bijective function and sent to the authenticator.
After receiving the message, the authenticator will
XOR the Result and its own Response. Subsequently,
it compares whether the value of the MidNum is the
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same as the result of the XOR, and it ﬁnally completes
the authentication. Even if the attacker intercepts the
encrypted MidNum value and the Result sent to the
authenticator, the value generated by XOR will not be
the shared-key.
Suppose that the attacker derives the data passed
between the nodes during the authentication process.
In this case, if the data sent each time complies with a
certain rule, the attacker is likely to discover this rule
and forge the identity of the node to send the same data
to gain trust. However, this problem can be effectively
solved duce to the randomness of the MidNum value.
If the attacker can derive the encrypted MidNum
from the authenticator and the data generated by the
true value of MidNum and Response, the sharedkey between the two sensor nodes cannot still be
obtained. The shared-key can be obtained only when
the MidNum value and the information sent to the
authenticator are simultaneously acquired. In the
authentication scheme, the initiator veriﬁes whether
the authenticator is trusted by comparing the random
number RandA , and the authenticator authenticates the
sensor node by comparing the MidNum. Accordingly,
the outer authentication scheme implements mutual
authentication between sensor nodes. Furthermore, it
is necessary to control the frequency of consecutive
authentications of the sensor nodes rigorously. If more
than three authentication failures occur, it is necessary
to conﬁrm whether the network has been attacked. The
authentication frequency counter can be set to implement
this function.
In summary, the outer layer authentication ensures the
lightweight and secure mutual authentication of sensor
nodes.

5

Experiment

Two major experiments were performed to evaluate
the effectiveness of the proposed authentication
mechanism. First, the crossover RO PUF was
implemented on the zynq7000, and its uniqueness
and stability were evaluated. Second, the network
topology was implemented in OMNET++ to make the
communication among nodes more random, and in this
process, the relevant parameters were counted. The
experimental results revealed that after the authentication
interval was set in the tree multi-hop network, the
conﬂict rate was lower, the data packets received per
unit time increased in amount, and the channel usage
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rate became more stable.
5.1
5.1.1

Performance evaluation of crossover RO PUF
Uniqueness

Uniqueness is used to evaluate the PUF quality[21] .
During the experiment, the frequency of each RO link
in the data was considered as the frequency of an
inverter because the delay of a single inverter cannot
be accurately obtained. According to the dataset, 100
pairs of a 256-bit response output were tested. The
ambient temperature was 25ıC, and the voltage was
1.2 V. The result showed that the average Hamming
distance between any two pairs was very close to
50% (ideal value). The response outputs at different
temperatures and voltages were yielded separately, and
one of the variables was set to a ﬁxed value. The average
Hamming Distances (HDs) of the response produced
on ﬁve FPGAs at different temperatures with a constant
voltage of 1.2 V are listed in Table 1.
Table 2 shows the average Hamming distance of the
response outputs in different FPGA development boards
with a constant outside temperature of 25ıC.
Figure 6 illustrates the frequency distribution of the
average Hamming distance of the crossover RO PUF.
Table 1

Average HD of ﬁve FPGAs outputs at U = 1.2 V.

Mode
Crossover RO[7]
RO PUF[29]
Neighborhood
Table 2

25ıC
0.489
0.467
0.466

35ıC
0.490
0.168
0.465

45ıC
0.491
0.467
0.464

55ıC
0.492
0.462
0.463

65ıC
0.491
0.462
0.460

Average HD of ﬁve boards outputs at T = 25ıC.

Mode
Neighborhood
RO PUF[29]
Crossover RO[7]

0.96 V 1.08 V 1.20 V 1.32 V 1.44 V
0.500 0.491 0.490 0.499 0.491
0.450 0.454 0.465 0.471 0.470
0.457 0.461 0.466 0.473 0.472

Fig. 6 Frequency distribution of the average HD of the
crossover RO PUF.
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Tables 1 and 2 and Fig. 6 indicate that the crossover
RO PUF had good uniqueness. Thus, it is basically
impossible for two PUFs to produce the same response.
5.1.2

Reliability

Reliability is another metric to evaluate the PUF
quality. For a PUF, the response with the same challenge
should be always identical in repeated experiments.
However, the external environmental factors (e.g.,
temperature and supply voltage) may change the delay
of the circuit and cause the PUF output to be unstable.
Temperature and voltage are critical factors affecting
the delay of the PUF circuit. Therefore, for the 256-bit
PUF on each board, the hamming distances between
responses under different temperatures and voltages are
calculated. Firstly, we conduct the experiments when
the voltage is 1.2 V and the temperatures are 25ıC,
35ıC, 45ıC, 55ıC, and 65ıC, respectively. Secondly,
we conduct the experiments when the temperature is
25ıC and the voltages are 0.96 V, 1.08 V, 1.20 V, 1.32 V,
and 1.4 V, respectively. According to the results of two
experiments, 90% of hamming distances is less than 10,
and no hamming distance is larger than 20.
5.2

Construction of network topology

Network simulators NS2, OPNET, and OMNET++ are
three major types of wireless sensor network simulation
software. NS2 is primarily used for discrete time
research, OPNET refers to a commercial communication
network simulation platform, and OMNET++ is a
popular discrete event simulation platform in science
and industry. In addition, OMNET++ has a powerful
graphical interface and node deﬁnition capabilities.
Hence, it was employed as the experimental platform in
this study.
In the OMNET++ network topology description
NED ﬁles, outerSensorNode.ned, SensorNode.ned, and
SinkNode.ned are deﬁned, representing the outer sensor
node, the inner sensor node, and the sink node,
respectively. WBAN.ned is deﬁned as the description
ﬁle of the entire network. The parameter conﬁguration
is shown in Table 3.
Table 3 Simulation environment parameters.
Parameter
Corresponding value
Number of nodes
3–12
Simulation duration
300 s
Data length
512 bit
Transmission rate
9.6 kbps
Transmission delay
10 ms
Signal channel
Wireless channel

After conﬁguring the above parameters, the .cc ﬁle
will get the corresponding parameter information from
the nodes according to the parameters deﬁned in .h for
loading and processing operations.
We establish the network to exclusively contain the
sensor nodes through the conﬁguration ﬁle. Figure 7
shows the data conﬂicts at the sink node within the
simulation time of 300 s in a network of 10 nodes.
Figure 8 is the data conﬂicts at the sink node in
a network of ﬁve nodes within the simulation time
of 300 s. In the ﬁgure, the state of the channel is
represented by three values of 0, 1, and 2. The value
2 reﬂects the conﬂict state. The comparison of the
legend reveals that when there are 10 nodes, the number
of channel collisions at the sink node is signiﬁcantly
more than that when they are only ﬁve sensor nodes.
Since the sensor nodes and the sink nodes randomly
communicate, the number of sensor nodes directly
affects the probability of conﬂicts at the sink nodes. If
the signals are directly retransmitted without waiting
for a period, the communication time will be longer,
and considerable re-transmission data will also increase
the overhead of energy consumption. Accordingly, for
the body area network, direct communication between
all nodes and the sink node results in greater energy
consumption.
Without setting the authentication waiting time, we
continuously increased the number of sensor nodes by

Fig. 7

Fig. 8

Channel state of 10 sink nodes in 300 s.

Channel state of 5 sink nodes in 300 s.
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setting variables in the NED ﬁle. It was found that when
the number of nodes is 13, continuous conﬂict will occur
after a period, as shown in Fig. 9. To detect whether
that is an exception, the number of nodes was increased
to more than 13. Experimental results show that the
continuous conﬂict will occur after communication for a
period. The main reason is that when two transmission
points are set to transmit data to the channel at the same
time, a conﬂict is triggered; thus, with the increase of
nodes, the conﬂict frequency increases. Increasing the
number of nodes to a certain extent may cause the sink
node to be in a conﬂict state all the time.
In this experiment, the waiting time for the node to
resend the authentication request after the collision is set
to 100 ms, and the number of inner sensor nodes, i.e.,
the number of interactions between the sensor node and
the sink node, was reduced. The number of received data
packets, channel utilization, and packet loss rate were
compared in the two network topologies.
Figure 10 demonstrates that in the case where only the
number of inlayer nodes was changed without setting
the retransmission time interval, the packet loss rate was
high; if the number of inlayer nodes was reduced, and
the retransmission time of the post-conﬂict data packet
was set, the package loss rate would drop signiﬁcantly.
With the increase of nodes, conﬂicts will increase
during data transmission, and the number of packets
received by the sink node per unit time will decrease. As
shown in Fig. 11, the average values of packets received
by the sink node per unit time between two different

Fig. 11 Average number of received packets by the sink
node per unit time.

network conﬁgurations are compared. As described
above, the direct retransmission means that the sensor
node retransmits the last sent message immediately after
receiving the conﬂict message returned by the sink node.
The waiting time we set was the same as that of the
previous experiment to ensure fairness.
Figure 11 demonstrates that with the increase of nodes
in the network topology, the number of packets received
by the sink node gradually decreased. The average
number of packets received by the sink node was higher
than the previous one when the retransmission waiting
time was set and the topology was changed.
Figure 12 shows the comparison of channel utilization
in two different scenarios. It can be seen that with
the increase of nodes, the channel utilization at the
sink node grows stably after the waiting time was
set and the topology was changed. However, the
channel utilization in the direct retransmission scenario
ﬂuctuated signiﬁcantly. This indicates that the network
becomes more stable after a waiting time was set and
outer nodes were added.

6

Fig. 9

Fig. 10

Consecutive conﬂict.

Comparison of data packet dropout rate.
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Conclusion

Authentication is especially important for network
security[31, 32] . In this paper, a PUF-based and cloudassisted lightweight authentication mechanism is
proposed for multi-hop body area network. In the
tree multi-hop network, the crossover RO PUF is preembedded in the sensor node, and sufﬁcient CRPs of the

Fig. 12

Comparison of channel utilization rate.
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inner node are stored in the cloud, thereby reducing the
storage overhead on the nodes in the body area network.
Experimental results show that after the authentication
interval was set in the tree multi-hop network, the
conﬂict rate was lower, the data packets received per
unit time increased in amount, and the channel usage
rate became more stable. Therefore, the lightweight
authentication scheme is more suitable for multi-hop
topology networks.
Acknowledgment
This work was supported by the National Natural
Science Foundation of China (Nos. 61874042 and
61602107), the Key Research and Development Program
of Hunan Province (No. 2019GK2082), the Hu-Xiang
Youth Talent Program (No. 2018RS3041), the Peng
Cheng Laboratory Project of Guangdong Province (No.
PCL2018KP004), the Fundamental Research Funds for
the Central Universities, and the Program for Lianning
Innovative Research. We would like to thank Mr. Lele
Liu’s contributions to the experiments of this paper.

[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

References
[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

Y. Ding, X. Yu, J. Zhang, and X. Xu, Application of
linear predictive coding and data fusion process for target
tracking by Doppler through-wall radar, IEEE Transactions
on Microwave Theory and Techniques, vol. 67, no. 3, pp.
1244–1254, 2019.
X. Lin, Y. Ding, X. Xu, and Y. Sun, A multi-target detection
algorithm using high-order differential equation, IEEE
Sensors Journal, vol. 19, no. 13, pp. 5062–5069, 2019.
S. Zhang, Y. Lin, Q. Liu, J. Jiang, B. Yin, and K.-K.
R. Choo, Secure hitch in location-based social networks,
Computer Communications, vol. 100, pp. 65–77, 2017.
S. Zhang, X. Li, H. Liu, Y. Lin, and A. K. Sangaiah,
A privacy-preserving friend recommendation scheme in
online social networks, Sustainable Cities and Society, vol.
38, pp. 275–285, 2018.
M. Kumar, Security issues and privacy concerns in
the implementation of wireless body area network, in
Proceedings of International Conference on Information
Technology, Singapore, 2015, pp. 58–62.
M. Kumar and P. Samundiswary, Wireless body area
network security issues-survey, in Proceedings of
International Conference on Control, Instrumentation,
Communication and Computational Technologies
(ICCICCT), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 2016, pp. 190–194.
Z. Pang, J. Zhang, Z. Qiang, S. Gong, and B. Tang,
Crossover ring oscillator PUF, in Proceedings of
International Symposium on Quality Electronic Design,
Santa Clara, CA, USA, 2017, pp. 237–243.
J. Zhang and G. Qu, Physical unclonable functionbased key sharing via machine leaning for IoT
security, IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics,
DOI:10.1109/TIE.2019.2938462.

[16]

[17]

[18]

[19]

[20]

[21]

[22]

[23]

K. Pardeep and L. Hoon-Jae, Security issues in healthcare
applications using wireless medical sensor networks: A
survey, Sensors, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 55–91, 2012.
C. Karlof, N. Sastry, and D. Wagner, TinySec: A link
layer security architecture for wireless sensor networks,
in Proceedings of International Conference on Embedded
Networked Sensor Systems, Hangzhou, China, 2004, p. 162.
A. Perrig, R. Canetti, J. D. Tygar, and D. Song, The tesla
broadcast authentication protocol, CryptoBytes, vol. 5, no. 2,
pp. 2–13, 2002.
M. Luk, G. Mezzour, A. Perrig, and V. Gligor, MiniSec:
A secure sensor network communication architecture, in
Proceedings of International Symposium on Information
Processing in Sensor Networks, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2007,
pp. 479–488.
S. M. Almheiri and H. S. Alqamzi, Data link layer
security protocols in wireless sensor networks: A survey,
in Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on
Networking, Xi’an, China, 2013, pp. 312–317.
P. Chuchaisri and R. Newman, Fast response PKC-based
broadcast authentication in wireless sensor networks,
Mobile Networks and Applications, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 508–
525, 2012.
N. Zhao, A. Ren, F. Hu, Z. Zhang, M. U. Rehman,
T. Zhu, X. Yang, and A. Alomainy, Double threshold
authentication using body area radio channel characteristics,
IEEE Communications Letters, vol. 20, no. 10, pp. 2099–
2102, 2016.
L. Ma, G. Yu, and Y. Zhu, TinyZKP: A lightweight
authentication scheme based on zero-knowledge proof
for wireless body area networks, Wireless Personal
Communications, vol. 77, no. 2, pp. 1077–1090, 2014.
Y. Liu, D. Liu, and G. Yue, A body gauss-markov-based
mobility model for body area networks, Tsinghua Science
and Technology, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 277–287, 2018.
M. H. Salama, S. Taha, and H. N. Elmahdy, PMAS:
A proposed mutual authentication scheme for wireless
body area networks, in Proceedings of International
Conference on Information and Communication Technology
Convergence, Jeju Island, Korea, 2015, pp. 636–641.
J. Yuan, S. Lu, S. Yu, and L. Ming, Authenticated secret
key extraction using channel characteristics for body area
networks, in Proceedings of ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, Toronto, Canada, 2012, p.
1028.
J. Zhang and G. Qu, Recent attacks and defenses on FPGAbased systems, ACM Transactions on Reconﬁgurable
Technology and Systems, DOI: 10.1145/3340557.
J. Zhang, G. Qu, Y. Q. Lv, and Q. Zhou, A survey on silicon
PUFs and recent advances in ring oscillator PUFs, Journal
of Computer Science and Technology, vol. 29, no. 4, pp.
664–678, 2014.
J. Zhang, X. Tan, Y. Zhang, W. Wang, and Z. Qin,
Frequency offset-based ring oscillator physical unclonable
function, IEEE Transactions on Multi-Scale Computing
Systems, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 711–721, 2018.
Q. Guo, J. Ye, Y. Gong, Y. Hu, and X. Li, PUF based

Xiao Tan et al.: A PUF-Based and Cloud-Assisted Lightweight Authentication for Multi-Hop Body Area Network

[24]

[25]

[26]

[27]

[28]

pay-per-device scheme for IP protection of CNN model,
in Proceedings of IEEE 27th Asian Test Symposium (ATS),
Hefei, China, 2018, pp. 115–120.
J. Zhang, X. Tan, X. Wang, A. Yan, and Z. Qin, Transparent
two-factor authentication, IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 32 677–
32 686, 2015.
J. Zhang, A practical logic obfuscation technique for
hardware security, IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale
Integration (VLSI) Systems, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 1193–1197,
2016.
J. Zhang, Y. Lin, Y. Lyu, and Q. Gang, A PUF-FSM
binding scheme for FPGA IP protection and pay-per-device
licensing, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics &
Security, vol. 10, no. 6, pp. 1137–1150, 2017.
J. Zhang, Y. Lin, and Q. Gang, Reconﬁgurable binding
against FPGA replay attacks, ACM Transactions on Design
Automation of Electronic Systems, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 1–20,
2015.
J. Zhang, B. Qi, and Q. Gang, HCIC: Hardware-assisted
Xiao Tan received the MS degree from
Hunan University, Changsha, China, in
2012. He is currently a PhD candidate in
Hunan University. Her current research
interests include hardware security and
internet of things.

Jiliang Zhang received the PhD degree
from Hunan University, Changsha, China,
in 2015. From 2013 to 2014, he worked
as a research scholar at the Maryland
Embedded Systems and Hardware Security
Lab, University of Maryland, College Park.
From 2015 to 2017, he was an associate
professor with Northeastern University,
China. Since 2017, he has joined Hunan University. His current
research interests include hardware/hardware-assisted security,
artiﬁcial intelligence security, and emerging technologies.
Prof. Zhang is a recipient of the Hu-Xiang Youth Talent, and
the best paper nominations in International Symposium on Quality
Electronic Design 2017. He has been serving on the technical
program committees of many international conferences, such
as ASP-DAC, FPT, GLSVLSI, ISQED, and AsianHOST. He is
a senior member of IEEE and a guest editor of the Journal of
Information Security and Applications and Journal of Low Power
Electronics and Applications.
Yuanjing Zhang is a visiting master
student at Hunan University, China. She
received the BS degree from Northeatern
University in 2019. She is currently a
master student in Beihang University. Her
main current research interest is hardware
security.

[29]

[30]

[31]

[32]

47

control-ﬂow integrity checking, IEEE Internet of Things
Journal, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 458–471, 2019.
G. Suh and S. Devadas, Physical unclonable functions
for device authentication and secret key generation, in
Proceedings of 44th ACM/IEEE Des. Autom. Conf., San
Diego, CA, USA, 2007, pp. 9–14.
D. Merli, J. Heyszl, B. Heinz, D. Schuster, F. Stumpf,
and G. Sigl, Localized electromagnetic analysis of RO
PUFS, in Proceedings of IEEE International Symposium on
Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, Austin, TX, USA,
2013, pp. 19–24.
K. Fan, H. Li, W. Jiang, C. Xiao, and Y. Yang, Secure
authentication protocol for mobile payment, Tsinghua
Science and Technology, vol. 23, no. 5, pp. 610–620, 2018.
J. Liu, Y. Yu, J. Jia, S. Wang, P. Fan, H. Wang, and H.
Zhang, Lattice-based double-authentication-preventing
ring signature for security and privacy in vehicular ad-hoc
networks, Tsinghua Science and Technology, vol. 24, no. 5,
pp. 575–584, 2019.

Zheng Qin received the PhD degree from
Chongqing University, Chongqing, China,
in 2001. He is currently a professor in
the College of Computer Science and
Electronic Engineering, Hunan University.
His current research interests include
network and data security, data analytics
and applications, machine learning, and
applied cryptography.
Yong Ding received the PhD degree from
the School of Communication Engineering,
Xidian University, China, in 2005. He
is currently a professor at the School of
Computer Science and Information Security,
Guilin University of Electronic Technology,
China. He was a research fellow of
Computer Science at City University of
Hong Kong from April 2008 to September 2009. His research
interests include cryptography and information security.
Xingwei Wang received the PhD
degree from the Northeastern University,
Shenyang, China, in 1998. He is currently
a professor at the College of Computer
Science and Engineering, Northeastern
University. His research interests include
future internet and cloud computing.

